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CASE COMMENT
ACADEMIC DISMISSALS FROM
STATE-SUPPORTED UNIVERSITIES: A
STUDY IN POLICY
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental guarantee of the United States Constitution is
that a state may not deprive an individual of liberty or property
without due process of law.' Although the scope of due process ex-
tends to state supported universities,2 the judiciary has historically
been reluctant to apply procedural due process requirements to
university administrative decisions.3 Indeed, in cases of academic
dismissals, it may be prudently asserted that administrative
academia enjoys a reign virtually unfettered by the concept of due
process.4
This policy of judicial nonintervention stems largely from the
belief that any form of judicial intrusion impairs the function of the
academic community. 5 The due process clause, however, is only the
constitutional embodiment of the fundamental concept of fair play.'
Unfortunately, conditions on university campuses are such that the
possibility of arbitrary academic evaluation is very real.7 Allowing
1. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due proces of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. "The Fourteenth Amendment as now applied to the States, protects the
citizen against the state itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not ex-
cepted. These have ... important, delicate and highly discretionary functions, but none
that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
In reference to private schools, see, e.g., Hendrickson, "State Action" and
Private Higher Education, 2 J. OF L. & EDUC. 53 (1973); Note, Common Law Rights for
Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120
(1974).
3. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
6. The due process clause "embodies a system of rights based on moral prin-
ciples so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society. ... Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7. Young, Due Process in the Classroom, 1 J. OF L. & EDUc.. 65, 66 (1972).
"The pressures on contemporary professors for research and publications, which pro-
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university administrators to by-pass all procedural safeguards in-
vites academic tyranny; it does not protect academic autonomy.'
Nevertheless, in Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri v. Horowitz,9 the Supreme Court concluded that the due
process clause does not require the imposition of procedural
safeguards in an academic dismissal from medical school." The
aforementioned policy of judicial nonintervention underlies the
Court's holding in Horowitz. The Court failed in its effort to
safeguard academic freedom, and succeeded only in manufacturing a
cloak" for those forms of governmental autocracy which the due pro-
cess clause was designed to prevent. This commentary examines
how the holding in Horowitz reflects the policy of judicial
nonintervention, the narrowing of the concept of liberty as a means
to accommodate that policy, and the effect of Horowitz on the
academic community.
FACTS
In August, 1971, the University of Missouri-Kansas City School
of Medicine'2 admitted Charlotte Horowitz. Instruction included
clinical responsibilities as well as academic study. Horowitz received
credit for all clinic courses."3 However, in the spring of 1972, several
faculty members criticized Horowitz's clinical performance." These
complaints provoked a flurry of student, faculty and administrative
vide the most rewards, leaves less and less time for attention to teaching respon-
sibilities. On many campuses, the grading of undergraduate papers and tests is
relegated to graduate assistants, leaving faculty free for other professional tasks." Id.
Non-teaching responsibilities assumed by professional school instructors surely equal
that of their undergraduate counterparts.
8. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
9. - U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
10. "We conclude that considering all relevant factors, including the
evaluative nature of the inquiry and the significant and historically supported interest
of the school in preserving its present framework for academic evaluations, a hearing
is not required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." I& at 953
n.3.
11. See note 87 infra and accompanying text.
12. Hereinafter referred to as UMKC.
13. Horowitz did not receive credit for her Emergency Room rotation, but
this rotation was not completed until after the decision to dismiss.
The University also contended that Horowitz did not satisfactorily complete
some courses in which she received credit. This distinction, however, was not com-
municated to Horowitz or other students. Horowitz v. Board of Curators of Univ. of
Mo., 538 F.2d 1317, 1318 n.1 (1976).
14. Specifically, the faculty members complained of lack of patient rapport,
"lack of expertise in coming to the fundamentals of the clinical problem," erratic atten-
dance, and poor personal hygiene. I& at 1319.
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reviews.15 Following recommendations from the Council on Evalua-
tion the administration decided that Horowitz would not be allowed
to graduate on schedule. The UMKC allowed an appeal."6 Ultimately,
Horowitz was dismissed effective July 3, 1973.17
Horowitz brought an action against UMKC in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri under 42
U.S.C. § 1983."8 Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant-uni-
versity failed to satisfy procedural due process requirements prior
to her dismissal. Specifically, Horowitz alleged that dismissal from a
state-supported educational institution resulted in a deprivation of
"liberty"'9 as provided for in the fourteenth amendment."0 Since one
may not be deprived of "liberty" without due process, Horowitz
asserted that she was entitled to a hearing prior to dismissal. The
district court held that immunity was traditionally accorded educa-
tional institutions in academic matters, absent a prima facie showing
of bad faith or capriciousness.' Plaintiff's complaint was, therefore,
dismissed. 2
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.23 The court held
that plaintiff's dismissal resulted in stigmatization sufficient to
foreclose opportunities in medically related fields. 4 Since this
foreclosure constituted deprivation of a constitutionally protected
15. Initially, the faculty-student Council on Evaluation reviewed the com-
plaints and recommended Horowitz be advanced to her final year on a probationary
basis. Midway through her final year another evaluation yielded recommendations that
Horowitz be dropped as a student absent radical improvement. These recommenda-
tions were made to the Co-ordinating Committee and ultimately to the Dean. Id
16. The appeal consisted of oral and practical examinations by seven practic-
ing physicians. Two physicians recommended graduation on schedule; three recom-
mended extended probation, and two recommended dismissal. Id. at 1320.
17. Id.
18. "Every person who, under color of any.., regulation .... of any State ....
subjects ... any citizen of the United States ...to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable ... in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
19. See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
20. See note 1 supra.
21. 538 F.2d at 1321.
22. Id,
23. Id.
24. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court acknowledged
that an action by the state which "imposed . . . a stigma or other disability that
foreclosed ... freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities" was a
deprivation of liberty. Id at 573.
1978]
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liberty interest,25 the court remanded to the district court with in-
structions to order defendants to provide a hearing."
The United States Supreme Court reversed," holding, per Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, that a dismissal for academic cause did not
necessitate a hearing before the school's decision-making body. 8 The
Court distinguished the firmly established right to a hearing accorded
a student dismissed from a public school for disciplinary reasons.'
In an effort to prevent enlargement of judicial presence in the
academic community, 0 four Justices joined in the majority opinion.'
Several members of the Court filed separate opinions. Noting
that UMKC had complied with minimal procedural due process re-
quirements, Mr. Justice White concurred in the judgment.2 Mr.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joined, concurred
in the result. Both Justices noted that no finding of a protected in-
terest was necessary since due process was accorded Horowitz.' Mr.
Justice Marshall dissented from that portion of the opinion which
suggested that academic dismissals required less procedural protec-
tions than disciplinary dismissals.' Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Brennan further recommended that the case be remanded to the
court of appeals for resolution of plaintiffs substantive due process
claim.3 Deciding an issue not before the Court, the majority held
that there was no showing of arbitrariness to warrant review of the
substantive due process claim.36
TRACING JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Property and Liberty Interests-Tools for Judicial Passivists
The concept of "liberty" is a flexible one." The Court has.
25. 538 F.2d at 1321.
26. I&
27. __ U.S. __ , 98 S. Ct. 948, 956 (1978).
28. I& at 953 n.3.
29. Mr. Justice Rehnquist explained that "[a] public hearing may be regarded
as helpful to the ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding out the
truth as to scholarship." Id. at 953, quoting Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216
Mass. 19, 22, 102 N.E. 1095, 1097 (1913). See generally Board of Curators of the Univ.
of Mo. v. Horowitz, - U.S. __ , 98 S. Ct. at 952-56.
30. __ U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. at 955.
31. Justices Burger, Stewart, Powell, and Stevens joined the majority opinion.
32. - U.S. , 98 S. Ct. at 958.
33. Id at 964.
34. Id. at 958-59.
35. Id at 964-65.
36. Id. at 956.
37. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Supreme Court
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recently explained that "liberty" "denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of an individual.., to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge....
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."3 Recognizing
this innate flexibility, during the early 1970's the Supreme Court
greatly expanded the definition of property and liberty interests to
include "entitlements." 39 Statutory entitlements were state-fostered
expectations such as employment, housing and welfare benefits."
Additionally, the Court recognized state-fostered liberty interests of
non-statutory origin.'" The Court thereby extended protection to
those interests on which the government had invited dependence.
A few years later, the Supreme Court began to narrow the en-
titlement concept. 2 Of particular interest for purposes of the pres-
ent inquiry was the Court's reluctance to review discretionary deci-
sions of administrative bodies." Due process protection was
therefore generally narrowed to statutory entitlements. This nar-
rowing resulted in a resurrection of the discredited rights-privilege
distinction." Reasonable state-fostered expectations no longer
stated that
"[1liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They are among
the [gireat [constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning
from experience . . . . [Tlhey relate to the whole domain of social and
economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well
that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.
Id. at 571, quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
38. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
39. Professor Charles Reich introduced the terminology and concept of entitle-
ment in his ground-breaking article, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
40. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's implied
tenure); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
41. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (reputation).
42. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (hearing not required in
dismissal of "permanent" city employee).
This rather abrupt change in judicial philosophy may be traced to the substan-
tial change in the composition of the United States Supreme Court beginning in 1969.
Within the next few years, President Nixon appointed five Justices to the Court.
43. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (state prisoner transferred to
inferior institution denied hearing).
44. At one time it was argued that school attendance was merely a privilege
and not a right. Expulsion or denial of admission by colleges and universities did not
result in a deprivation of liberty or property under the fourteenth amendment. E.g.,
Board of Trustees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827 (1914), aff'd, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
1978]
et al.: Academic Dismissals from State-Supported Universities: A Study in
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1978
180 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.13
amounted to interests accorded due process protection unless they
were of statutory origin. This narrow view of entitlement had no
relation to reasonable expectations or to public understanding. More
recently, the Court has come to recognize even fewer interests than
were recognized before the doctrine of entitlement. For example, in
Paul v. Davis45 the Court found that reputation alone was neither a
liberty nor a property interest for purposes of procedural protec-
tion." As will be seen in the subsequent analysis of Horowitz, the
Court has further eroded the concept of liberty by a reaffirmation of
this narrow view of a reputation interest.
Theoretical Bases for Judicial Restraint
In Horowitz, the Court exhibited substantial concern for the
maintenance of academic autonomy. This characteristic reluctance to
interfere with post secondary school administrative decisions has
several theoretical bases. 7
Until recently courts had characterized post secondary educa-
tion as a privilege rather than a right.4 Since there was no right,
the state could distribute its benefits as it deemed appropriate.
Courts have since recognized that even "privileges" may not be
denied for reasons which violate constitutional guarantees. 9 Thus
the right-privilege distinction has been abandoned.'
The common law doctrine of in loco parentis51 was another early
theoretical basis for proponents of judicial passivism. The theory of
in loco parentis generally stated that a school took the place of a
student's parents while the student was attending school. Courts
45. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
46. Previously, the Court had recognized reputation as an important pro-
tected liberty interest. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971.
47. See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1045, 1144-54 (1968).
48. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827 (1914),
affd 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
49. Accord, Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
"Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a privilege, the fact remains
that it is an interest of almost incalculable value ... ." Id at 178. See generally Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935);
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
50. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Doc-
trine in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 153(2) (1965). See, e.g., Suits v.
Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954).
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soon recognized, however, that the function of the school at higher
levels of education differed significantly from the function of the
parent. The doctrine of in loco parentis, therefore, no longer
justified tolerance of virtually unchecked disciplinary dismissals in
the nation's public colleges and universities."
It was not until the landmark decision in Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education,53 however, that students were accorded
constitutional guarantees in disciplinary dismissals. In Dixon, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the privilege theory, noting the incalcuable
value of education: "[Elducation is vital and, indeed, basic to a civilized
society. Without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be able
to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to
fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of
good citizens."' Dixon marked the beginning of an era of judicial
recognition and concern for students' constitutional rights.55
Judicial Restraint and Academic Dismissals
Academic dismissals remain the final bastion in the public
school student battle to secure procedural due process protection."
52. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic
Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290, 292 (1968).
53. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
54. Id. at 157. Accord, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expen-
ditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to our democratic society .... In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education.
Id at 493.
55. Following Dixon, lower federal courts gradually came to extend various
elements of procedural due process to students in public institutions. E.g., Hagopian v.
Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972) (entitled to hearing but not counsel); Brown v.
Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1970) (entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard);
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (entitled to
notice, inspection of evidence, counsel, hearing, recordings); Due v. Fla. A. & M. Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (entitled to notice and hearing); Knight v. State Bd. of
Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (entitled to notice and hearing). It was not
until Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly recognized a student's right to procedural due process when faced with
disciplinary suspension from a public secondary school. The Court did not extend this
constitutional guarantee, however, to academic dismissals from post secondary schools.
56. The Court has previously addressed the due process rights of teachers
who have been dismissed. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952).
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Historically the dismissal of a student for failure to maintain a
prescribed scholastic rating had been left wholly to the discretion of
school officials." Courts would not review an academic dismissal ab-
sent a prima facie showing that the decision to dismiss was ar-
bitrary, capricious or in bad faith.' In Connelly v. Univeristy of
Vermont" the court explained:
[I]n matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uni-
quely qualified by training and experience to judge the
qualifications of a student, and efficiency of instruction
depends in no small degree upon the school faculty's
freedom from interference from other non-educational
tribunals. It is only when the school authorities abuse this
discretion that a court may interfere with their decision
to dismiss a student."
Once again, the underlying assumption is that judicial interference
jeopardizes academic freedom.
This strict policy of judicial nonintervention has given way in
recent years to two principal exceptions. First, when a purportedly
academic dismissal is clearly based on non-academic considerations,
courts have been willing to intervene. 1 For example, in Connelly,
the district court recognized that the judicial policy of noninterven-
tion into academic affairs was not applicable where a medical stu-
dent alleged that his instructor had decided to assign a failing grade
before the student had completed the course." Secondly, when an
academic dismissal involves unusually serious consequences for the
student, courts will scrutinize the allegation that the dismissal was
for academic reasons.' Nevertheless, the rule remains one of broad
judicial deference to administrative determinations. The recent deci-
sion in Mahavongsanan v. Hall" again enunciated the distinction be-
57. E.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Mustell v. Rose,
282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968); Barnard v. Inhabitants of
Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913); West v. Miami Univ., 41 Ohio App. 367,
181 N.E. 144 (1931); Foley v. Benedict, 121 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932).
58. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Gasper v. Bruton, 513
F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975); Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Brookins v.
Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
59. 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
60. Id. at 160.
61. Id.
62. Id at 161.
63. Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975).
64. 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
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tween standards of review for academic as opposed to disciplinary
dismissals: "Misconduct and failure to attain a standard of scholar-
ship cannot be equated. A hearing may be required to determine
charges of misconduct, but a hearing may be useless or harmful in
finding out the truth concerning scholarship." 5
THE HOROWITZ ANALYSIS
Hearing Requirement Satisfied
In Horowitz, respondent alleged that her fourteenth amend-
ment right to procedural due process had been violated."' The four-
teenth amendment guarantees procedural safeguards to one who has
been deprived of either a liberty or a property interest. 7 Although
Horowitz did not allege a deprivation of a property interest," she
did allege a deprivation of a liberty interest. 9 In spite of this allega-
tion, Horowitz simply did not present an opportunity to determine
whether an academic dismissal from a public university constituted
a deprivation of liberty. Assuming the existence of a protected liberty
interest, UMKC accorded respondent ample procedural protection."0
Admittedly the necessary elements of a dismissal hearing are
still widely disputed. 1 But "[t]he very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation."7 What process is due will vary "according to
the specific factual context.""3 It is generally agreed that an "infor-
mal give and take"7 between the student and the administration
65. Id at 450.
66. __ U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. at 950.
67. See note 1 supra.
68. - U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. at 951.
69. Id.
70. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. The assessment procedures
used at UMKC included notice, a hearing, and an appeal.
71. See, e.g., Sullivan v, Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th
Cir. 1973) (impartial decisionmaker); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La.
1969) (counsel); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (record
of proceedings).
72. - U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. at 953, quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
73. - U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. at 952, quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
442 (1960). See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971). Accord, Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
74. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
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will suffice."5 The UMKC assessment procedures amply complied
with this requirement.
This determination was dispositive of Horowitz. Nevertheless,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist went on to resolve issues not necessary to
the disposition of the case. Obviously this approach may be
disastrous. As Mr. Justice Marshall emphasized:
[The] great gravity and delicacy of our task in constitu-
tional cases should cause us to shrink from anticipat[ing] a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity
of deciding it, and from formulating a rule of constitu-
tional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied."
As a result, further determinations by the Court may reasonably be
considered dicta. In view of the force of the Supreme Court forum,
however, it becomes necessary to analyze those findings.
Injury to Reputation Does Not Constitute Deprivation of Liberty
Justice Rehnquist reiterated the requirement of "reputation
plus" to constitute a recognizable liberty interest." A dismissal
alone is not sufficient damage to reputation to constitute a depriva-
tion of a liberty interest. However, publication of the reasons for the
dismissal could amount to stigmatization sufficient to constitute an
infringement of liberty." Noting that Horowitz had been dismissed
without publication of the reasons for her dismissal, the Court con-
cluded that the damage to her reputation was not sufficient to con-
stitute a deprivation of liberty.79
This argument is specious at best. Initial institutionally
generated publication of the reasons for dismissal is inconsequential.
Realistically, a student dismissed from medical school will be com-
pelled to reveal the fact of dismissal to other educational institu-
tions and prospective employers during application procedures. As
noted by Justice Marshall, Horowitz had been stigmatized to the ex-
75. Id. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 9 (1975).
76. __ U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. 948, 959-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoting
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concur-
ring).
77. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
697 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d
5 (1975).
78. __ U.S. __ , 98 S. Ct. at 952.
79. See __ U.S. __ , 98 S. Ct. at 951-52.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1978], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss1/5
ACADEMIC DISMISSALS
tent that she was unable to continue her medical education."° Fur-
thermore, her chances for employment in any medically related field
were severely damaged.8' An academic dismissal with or without
publication of the specific reasons for dismissal results in com-
parable injury to the student. The resulting need for procedural pro-
tection is equally compelling.2
Policy Considerations
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the severe deprivation involved
in dismissal from medical school." But the Court explained that the
nature of the interest affected was only one of several considera-
tions. Other relevant factors included "the evaluative nature of the
inquiry and the significant and historically supported interest of the
school in preserving its present framework for academic evaluations
... "' In this expression of policy lies the foundation for judicial
nonintervention in academic affairs. Courts have historically attempt-
ed to protect academic institutions from interference from outsiders.
In doing so the judiciary has unwittingly subjected those same
institutions to ill-will and caprice generated within their own educa-
tional confines. Only through judicial protection of the right to in-
dividual academic freedom can institutional academic freedom
flourish.15
In summary, the allegation that a dismissal is for "academic"
reasons does not warrant wholesale judicial acceptance of a school's
determinations. Such a "talismanic reliance on labels"8 may provide
a cloak for administrators who are reluctant to accord due process
to their students. The judiciary can most effectively safeguard
academic freedom through the imposition of procedural due process
80. Id at 960 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id., quoting Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267, 1296-97 (1975): "[Wjhen the State seeks 'to deprive a person of a way of life to
which [s]he has devoted years of preparation and on which Isihe .. .has come to rely,'
it should be required first to provide a 'high level of procedural protection."'
83. __ U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. at 953 n.3.
84. Id
85. Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History,
28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 431, 440 (1963).
86. __ U.S. - , 98 S. Ct. at 963 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
87. For example, the minutes of the meeting at which it was decided that
Horowitz should not graduate contained the following: "This issue is not one of
academic achievement but of performance, relationship to people and ability to com-
municate." Id. at 962. See note 14 supra. Yet the Court persistently characterized
Horowitz's dismissal as an "academic" one.
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requirements. Due process is a minimal and essential safeguard
against suppression of academic freedom." Substantive evaluation of
an academic dismissal may be beyond the realm and ability of the
judiciary, but certainly a hearing requirement within the school will
provide at least "a meaningful hedge against erroneous action." 9
CONCLUSION
Students are essentially in a position of dependence on their
respective educational institutions. Admission, curriculum, grading
and degree requirements are within the sole discretion of the in-
dividual school. The school holds the key to the student's intellectual
and economic future. These respective interests of student and ad-
ministration need not be in opposition. The student facing an
academic dismissal is interested in participating in a hearing to test
the validity of the pending dismissal. On the other hand, the school
has an interest in maintaining its discretionary power. The obvious
resolution is to require a university to employ its discretionary and
academic expertise within a school-conducted hearing. Judicial
passivists should have no objection to such a resolution, for it is only
in substantive review of administrative decisions regarding
academic expertise that academic freedom becomes subject to
judicial scrutiny.
In an effort to preserve academic autonomy, the Court utilized
an unrealistically narrow view of the concept of liberty. Ultimately
it was suggested that an academic dismissal from a public medical
college did not constitute a deprivation of liberty in the absence of
publication or other acts. Those acts which would constitute
stigmatization were never clearly delineated by the Court but still
depend on the specific fact situation and must be decided on a case
by case basis.
Interested parties must employ caution in the interpretation
and application of the Horowitz findings. The entire Court agreed
that Horowitz had been accorded all the procedural due process re-
quired under the fourteenth amendment. In the majority opinion,
Justice Rehnquist seemed to base this holding upon a finding that
the fourteenth amendment did not require any hearing before an.
88. See Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 447 (1963). "The struggle for academic freedom has
demonstrated that due process is a means essential to achieve that great end." Id. at
484.
89. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
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academic dismissal. But five Justices, a majority of the Court, filed
separate opinions noting that UMKC accorded Horowitz all the due
process required, assuming a constitutionally protected interest.
Since this finding was dispositive, other judicial determinations may
be fairly viewed as dicta. It should also be noted that Horowitz did
not allege a deprivation of a property interest. This possible theory
of recovery still awaits Supreme Court consideration. The fate of
students dismissed for academic reasons therefore rests heavily on
lower court interpretation.
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